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Abstract
Background: Since COVID-19 vaccines became broadly available to the adult population, sharp divergences in uptake have
emerged along partisan lines. Researchers have indicated a polarized social media presence contributing to the spread of mis- or
disinformation as being responsible for these growing partisan gaps in uptake.
Objective: The major aim of this study was to investigate the role of influential actors in the context of the community structures
and discourse related to COVID-19 vaccine conversations on Twitter that emerged prior to the vaccine rollout to the general
population and discuss implications for vaccine promotion and policy.
Methods: We collected tweets on COVID-19 between July 1, 2020, and July 31, 2020, a time when attitudes toward the vaccines
were forming but before the vaccines were widely available to the public. Using network analysis, we identified different naturally
emerging Twitter communities based on their internal information sharing. A PageRank algorithm was used to quantitively
measure the level of “influentialness” of Twitter accounts and identifying the “influencers,” followed by coding them into different
actor categories. Inductive coding was conducted to describe discourses shared in each of the 7 communities.
Results: Twitter vaccine conversations were highly polarized, with different actors occupying separate “clusters.” The antivaccine
cluster was the most densely connected group. Among the 100 most influential actors, medical experts were outnumbered both
by partisan actors and by activist vaccine skeptics or conspiracy theorists. Scientists and medical actors were largely absent from
the conservative network, and antivaccine sentiment was especially salient among actors on the political right. Conversations
related to COVID-19 vaccines were highly polarized along partisan lines, with “trust” in vaccines being manipulated to the
political advantage of partisan actors.
Conclusions: These findings are informative for designing improved vaccine information communication strategies to be
delivered on social media especially by incorporating influential actors. Although polarization and echo chamber effect are not
new in political conversations in social media, it was concerning to observe these in health conversations on COVID-19 vaccines
during the vaccine development process.
(JMIR Infodemiology 2022;2(1):e34231) doi: 10.2196/34231
https://infodemiology.jmir.org/2022/1/e34231

XSL• FO
RenderX

JMIR Infodemiology 2022 | vol. 2 | iss. 1 | e34231 | p. 1
(page number not for citation purposes)

JMIR INFODEMIOLOGY

Hagen et al

KEYWORDS
COVID-19, vaccine hesitancy, social media, influential actors; influencer; Twitter

Introduction
The rollout of COVID-19 vaccines in the United States has been
characterized by high degrees of hesitancy and mistrust. Vaccine
hesitancy is deﬁned as “the decision to delay vaccination or the
refusal to vaccinate despite available vaccination services” [1].
By mid-2020, only 50% of Americans were estimated to be
willing to receive a COVID-19 vaccination right away [2].
Although estimates improved by December 2020, with 70% of
Americans indicating they “definitely” or “probably” would
vaccinate against COVID-19 [3], hesitancy began to take a sharp
partisan turn subsequent to the 2020 election, and uptake has
been characterized by acute partisan divides overtaking other
forms of hesitancy [3-6]. Nearly 6 months after all Americans
aged at least 12 years old became eligible for the vaccine,
counties with a larger share of Trump voters had consistently
lower vaccination rates contributing to ongoing surges in
hospitalizations fueled by the more transmissible Delta variant
[6-8]. That vaccine hesitancy should be higher among political
conservatives and Trump supporters was not inevitable. Rather,
research shows that it may be related to a deliberate strategy
undertaken by the antivaccine movement in 2015 to pivot to
the far right under the label of “medical freedom” and the
formation of political action committees linked to the American
Tea Party and its protests against government interference [9].
Moreover, hesitancy was first amplified by the political nature
of the vaccine development process, occurring under intense
political pressure to reopen the economy and heightened by
public concern about the safety and efficacy of emergent
COVID-19 vaccines.
Infodemiology is the science of tracing the “distribution and
determinants of information in an electronic medium,
specifically the Internet, or in a population, with the ultimate
aim to inform public health and public policy” [10]. Due to
increasing use of social media for health information-seeking
[11], it is becoming increasingly important for public health
professionals to better engage with social media [12]. Studies
have made progress in measuring information prevalence by
adopting computational methods to track the trends of public
discourse and emotions on social media [13-16]. Although social
media holds the potential to raise awareness and positive
endorsement of vaccines, these conversations are vulnerable to
political manipulation and tend to silo users into echo chambers
(where beliefs are reinforced by exposure to repeated
information associated with individual attitudes inside a closed
system) [17].
Even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, there was evidence that
social media vaccine conversations have been targeted by
Russian trolls and bots to purposefully manipulate and stoke
antivaccine sentiment for political ends [18]. Antivaccine groups
are reported to be more active on social media than provaccine
accounts [19]. A study of 1344 tweets with the “vaccine”
hashtag (#vaccine) between 2010 and 2016 found that
antivaccine tweets were 4.13 times more likely to be retweeted
than neutral tweets in comparison to 1.58 for provaccine tweets
https://infodemiology.jmir.org/2022/1/e34231
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[19]. Evidence from over 100 million Facebook users found
that antivaccine communities had the highest growth during the
measles outbreak of 2019, dominating the main vaccine
conversation with narratives that were targeted at swaying the
undecided group toward greater skepticism. Meanwhile,
provaccine groups were isolated within their community
believing they were “winning” [20].
These findings highlight the outsized role that the most active
influencers on social media play in spreading health information.
In fact, a recent study found that just 12 influential people on
social media were responsible for 73% of the total antivaccine
posts on Facebook [21]. Likewise, the most active 25% of US
Twitter accounts create 97% of tweets [22].
To devise more practical eHealth communication strategies, it
is crucial to investigate the role of influential “actors” and their
contribution to the amplification of vaccine information in
targeted networks. This study, therefore, sought to identify the
most influential actors related to COVID-19 vaccine
conversations on Twitter and describe their communication
patterns and content during July 2020, a time when attitudes
toward the vaccines were forming but before the vaccines were
widely available to the public [23].

Methods
Research Questions
Our research examined the following research questions
pertaining to influential actors and discourse in the polarization
of the COVID-19 conversations on Twitter:
Research question (RQ) 1 was “What distinctive communities
naturally emerged within the COVID-19 vaccine conversation
on Twitter at a time when COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy was at
its peak? What does that community structure look like? “
RQ2 was “Who are the most influential actors in this Twitter
conversation? What is the role of science and medical experts
in the vaccine conversation?”
RQ3 was “What is the level of engagement of retweeting
activities in each community?”
RQ4 was “What are the primary topics discussed among the
most influential actors within each community?”

Data Collection
Data were collected in 2 phases. In the first phase, we collected
COVID-19–relevant tweets, and in the second phase, we
selected vaccine-relevant tweets from the first data set. We
initially collected all COVID-19 relevant data on Twitter using
the Twitter application programming interface (API) between
July 1, 2020, and July 31, 2020, using a query list composed
by the University of Southern California [24]. From the collected
Twitter data, we further filtered tweets about vaccines that
included any of the following keywords: “vaccine,”
“antivaxxers,” “antivaccine,” “coronavirusvaccine,” “vaccines,”
“CoronavirusVaccine” (Multimedia Appendix 1).
JMIR Infodemiology 2022 | vol. 2 | iss. 1 | e34231 | p. 2
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The keyword sets yielded 1,300,828 tweets, which included a
total of 751,691 unique Twitter accounts.

Data Preparation
A node is a Twitter account, which we interchangeably call an
actor when we refer to its behavior. We defined an edge as a
retweet focusing on information sharing among Twitter accounts
[25,26]. When Twitter account A retweets a tweet created by
account B, there is a directed edge from A to B. The weight of
an edge is the frequency of retweets from A to B. Our data set
yielded a total of 617,497 nodes and 910,483 edges, which we
sorted by decreasing order based on the weights of edges in
order to sample the most active nodes in the discussion network.
Gephi version 0.9.2 [27] was used for data analysis and network
visualization, which has upper limits on the size of the data it
can handle. Initially a total of 100,000 edges (83,098 of the
most active nodes) with the highest weights was sampled, which
is the approximate maximum volume of data Gephi can handle
with the local machine (Ryzen 5800x 8 core 16 thread CPU, 16
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GB of DDR4 memory, and dedicated GPU Nvidia 3060ti). This
process is sampling the top 11% of the most highly influential
Twitter accounts based on the number of retweets. We called
this the “first data set,” which was used to answer RQ2, RQ3,
and RQ4.
However, since this initial volume of data was still too large
for meaningful visualization, highly active nodes were further
filtered by selecting nodes with edge weights of 7 or higher
within the giant components. This data set with a total of 7382
edges and 1992 nodes was used for the visualization to answer
RQ1. We called this the “second data set.”

Analysis
For rich understanding of a phenomenon from social media
data, a mixed methods approach was used by incorporating
computational analysis with manual analyses. Figure 1
demonstrates the data collection and analysis process, and the
following sections explain the methods used to answer each of
the 4 research questions.

Figure 1. Data collection and analysis.

Community Detection and Visualization

include only a small number of nodes (some contain only 1 or
2 nodes).

To detect and visualize the social landscape of the communities,
Gephi [27], an open source software, was used for network
analysis and visualization. To detect naturally emerging
communities, the Louvain [28] algorithm, an unsupervised
clustering algorithm, was used on account of its high-quality
results [29]. The Louvain algorithm automatically creates
clusters (or communities) from a given data set by partitioning
a network into “communities of densely connected nodes” by
separating these nodes from other nodes in different
communities [28].

We used these initial clustering results, with minimal
manipulation, for the sampling data for the annotation tasks in
RQ2 and RQ4 and for the K-core analysis to answer RQ3. To
make sure that the clustering results were not created from
random chance, we ran the algorithm with the same default
setting over 10 times and assured that the produced outcomes
were consistent—we validated that the network structure was
identical and the 100 most influential nodes were almost
identical each time.

The first data set yielded a total of 5397 clusters using only the
default settings of the Louvain algorithm. The top 20 clusters
explained about 71% of the nodes, which means that, when
using the default settings of Louvain algorithm, many clusters

Since the initial visualization results from the first data set were
too complex due to the overwhelming number of clusters, the
Louvain algorithm was run one more time using the second data
set, which included a smaller number of nodes: those with the
most active retweeting behavior (a total of 1992 nodes, ≥7

https://infodemiology.jmir.org/2022/1/e34231
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degree weight). The default parameters of the Louvain algorithm
produced 9 clusters with the second data set. Figure 2 is from
this second data set. Multimedia Appendix 2 shows the top 7
clusters from the first data set (of the 5397 clusters) and second
data set (of the 9 clusters), respectively. All 7 clusters were the
same in both results, which validates that the Louvain algorithm
produced consistent results with minor proportional changes.

Hagen et al
For a spatial representation of the network, we used ForceAtlas2
[30], in which nodes, sharing similar local environments, appear
closer to each other. The visualized map shows locations the
nodes occupy in networks to indicate the strategic importance
of them in specific topic communication.

Figure 2. Network graph of Twitter conversations about COVID 19 vaccines using the 1992 accounts with the highest PageRank; 2 clusters (explaining
3% and 0% of all the nodes) were excluded. Node color indicates a unique cluster, and node size indicates the level of influence (according to PageRank),
with bigger nodes more influential among the networks.

Influential Actors and the Role of Science and Medical
Experts in Vaccine Conversations
Diverse measures were available to quantitatively capture the
level of influentialness of a node. Betweenness centrality
measures may capture the high brokerage potential of a node.
Eigenvector centrality can measure the level of popularity of a
node based on the connection to other important nodes.
PageRank [31] is a variant of eigenvector centrality that counts
if a node is endorsed by important nodes. PageRank, formulated
by Page and Brin [31], was developed to measure the level of
influentialness of a website by giving weights to a website with
a higher number of incoming links by other importantwebsites.
We used PageRank to measure the influentialness of a node
because a high PageRank value indicates trust and reliability
of a node [32], instead of the eigenvector centrality that simply
measures the popularity of a node. In our data, a node with a
high PageRank means that the node is highly endorsed and
trusted by others because its content is frequently retweeted by
other important nodes.
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The goal of this work was to investigate the types of influential
actors in the vaccine discussion and to understand the role of
scientific and medical experts. In the preparation of the analysis,
we sampled the top 100 most influential nodes based on the
PageRank value. First, the 30 most influential accounts,
according to their PageRank value, were used to develop a
category scheme of actor types. To develop the categories of
these actors, researchers manually reviewed (1) publicly
available Twitter profiles, (2) tweets created or shared by these
influential actors, and (3) subsequent web searches (ie,
Wikipedia pages) when necessary. A total of 11 actor categories
were developed (see Table 1), and 30 accounts were enough to
reach a saturation. Second, in order to have a robust
categorization of the influential actor types, 70 additional nodes
with the highest PageRank value were further sampled. A
graduate student followed the category scheme to code the
additional nodes. The first researcher revisited the later codes
to validate the coding and double checked the consistency. The
researcher further consulted with vaccine and medical experts
to validate the coding results.
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Table 1. Category scheme developed for the annotation of actor types.
Number

Category scheme

Definition

1

News media

Mainstream news media

2

Activist

Individual actors, not organizations, who campaign to bring about social and political changes

3

Partisan

An individual or official account in which the main goal is to support a political figure or a political party

4

Medical expert

An individual with an official medical expertise (ie, medical doctor, researcher, and registered nurse)

5

Academic institution An official account representing academic institution (ie, universities, medical journals)

6

Culture

The main content of the Twitter account is about culture (ie, a BTS fan account)

7

Government

A government organization

8

Business

A company’s official account or an account that clearly pursues financial gain

9

Politician

Elected officials

10

Random individual

A personal account that does not correspond to any of the above categories

11

Suspended

An account that existed during the data collection but was suspended before the category development phase

Ethics Review
The institutional review board (IRB) of the leading author’s
institution responded that our work was considered to be
not-human subject research; therefore, IRB review and approval
was not required. Although it is not legally required, our
research team decided to follow the best practices for ethical
Twitter research [33]. The Belmont principle of “respect for
persons” requires receiving informed consent from the study
subjects. Receiving informed consent from a large data set is
not feasible. Instead, Fiesler and Proferes [33] suggested that
scholars should identify users only when “the benefits of doing
so clearly outweigh the potential harms.” Our goal was to
identify the role of the accounts, not the specific identity of the
accounts. Revealing the identity of personal accounts may
violate the respect for persons principle considering the majority
of Twitter users are not aware of use of tweets by researchers,
and thus feel that researchers should not be able to use tweets
without consent [33]. One exception might be “verified
accounts” for which Twitter provides a blue badge for accounts
“that are of high public interest.” Since this verification process
requires the account owners to apply for it by themselves and
only specific types of accounts are eligible (ie, government,
news organizations, activists) [34], we can safely assume that
the owners of verified accounts are “public figures” who “waive
a substantial part of their right to privacy” for academic research
purposes [35,36]. We anonymized personal and unverified
Twitter accounts to protect the privacy of these users and only
revealed the account names of “verified” accounts.

K-Core Analysis
K-core analysis was used to investigate the level of tight
connections. A k-core is “a maximal group of nodes, all of
which are connected to at least K other nodes in the group” [37].
For example, K=3 means that every member of the clique (a
small and highly interconnected group) is connected to at least
3 other clique members. K-core, a relaxed measure of a clique,
is a measure to capture the level of interconnectivity. Clique is
a term that refers to a small and highly connected group in which
all nodes in the clique are connected to all other nodes.
Identifying cliques is important because information can be
https://infodemiology.jmir.org/2022/1/e34231
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shared quickly within a clique and members of a clique behave
in a cohesive manner [37].

Inductive Coding
Lastly, inductive coding was conducted by manually reading
tweets assigned to each cluster. In preparation for the inductive
coding, 7 clusters were purposefully selected from the first data
set: 5 of the biggest clusters (political right; major news media;
antivaccine; Trump and the White House; political left) were
selected (see the size of the clusters in Multimedia Appendix
2), and 2 clusters (science, medical experts) from the top 20
clusters were purposefully included in the sample because we
were interested in the role of scientists and medical experts.
This was followed by sampling a maximum of 200 tweets
created by the top 5 Twitter accounts with the highest PageRank
value from each of the 7 selected clusters. Inductive coding
techniques, modeled on grounded theory, were used for the
analysis. The first coding phase used open coding followed by
a second phase, axial coding, to document trends in each cluster
for (1) thematic topic of concern; (2) manifest content such as
explicitly stated vaccine risks or benefits and actors
(beneficiaries or agents); and (3) latent content such as the
function of discourse. The third phase used selective coding to
yield brief summaries of patterns in the coded clusters. To
establish intercoder agreement in each cluster’s blind coding,
10% of each cluster’s coded data were randomized and verified
to exceed 90% agreement. Following practices of social
reliability in qualitative research [38], disagreement was
discussed and collaboratively recoded as “code unspecified.”
If a cluster had more than 10% of codes that disagreed in the
sample, the entire cluster was coded by the second coder, and
differences were again discussed. This created higher metrics
of researcher social reliability [39], which improves the overall
accuracy and validity.

Results
Naturally Emerging Communities
Using the second data set (a total of 7382 edges and 1992
nodes), the Louvain algorithm automatically detected 9 clusters
and assigned numeric values (from 0 to 8) to each of the cluster.
JMIR Infodemiology 2022 | vol. 2 | iss. 1 | e34231 | p. 5
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Since assigned numbers are not meaningful, we assigned
meaningful labels to the biggest 6 clusters (2 clusters were too
small to discuss, and 2 clusters were adjacent to each other and
thematically the same, so we combined the 2 as Indian news
media). The labels were decided based on the user profile
description of the top 10 most influential nodes (based on the
PageRank value) in each of the clusters.
Figure 2 shows the labels of the 6 major clusters (Trump White
House, political right, political left, major news media, Indian
news media, and antivaccine). The biggest community was
Trump White House (27%), followed by political right (15%)
and political left (14%). Figure 2 illustrates that the political
right and antivaccine clusters included the most influential actors
(the bigger sized nodes are more influential actors in the entire
discussion network in Figure 2).
Analyzing the relationship among the clusters, academic
organizations and medical experts (discussed in the Primary
Topics Discussed Within Communities section) were located
close to the major news media and political left clusters (in
Figure 2). This means that the major news media and political
left tend to depend on information sources from scientific
sources and medical experts in contrast with the political right
and antivaccine activists who tend to depend on their own
information sources.

Hagen et al

Most Influential Accounts and the Role of Science and
Medical Experts in Vaccine Conversation
Using an iterative coding approach, a total of 11 categories were
developed (academic organization, activist, business, culture,
government, medical expert, news media, partisan, personal,
politician, and suspended) for the manual coding of the 100
most influential accounts. Table 2 presents the manual coding
results, reporting that the news media (27%) and partisan actors
(20%) were the biggest actor categories. The polarized network
graphs and active involvement by supporters of President Trump
showed direct involvement of politics in COVID-19 vaccine
discussions. In an inquiry to find the role of science and medical
experts, results showed that only 10% and 2% of the 100 most
influential accounts were medical experts and academic
organizations, respectively. The activists, explaining 11% of
the 100 most influential actors, were either antivaccine activists
or “conspiracy theorists” who believe that COVID-19 is a
human-engineered disaster. Multimedia Appendix 3 shows the
account names and the typology of the top 11 partisan actors
(in red font). The partisan actors are more frequently from the
Trump White House and political right clusters. A total of 5
accounts was suspended, all of which (blue font in Multimedia
Appendix 3) appear on the right side of the polarized network.
Suspension follows Twitter’s internal policy, whereby accounts
are suspended mainly for spamming, security at risk, abusive
tweets, or abusive behavior [40].

Table 2. Categories of the top 100 influential actors.

a

Category

Description and verified Twitter handlesa

Frequency, n

News media

Major news media such as Bloomberg, Reuters, and the Associated Press

27

Partisan

16 accounts out of 20 were Trump supporters. All the verified accounts were @TeamTrump, @ASlavitt, 20
@ksorbs, @charliekirk11, @TrumpWarRoom, @AndrewHClark, @Jillie_Alexis, @AntonioSabatoJr,
@tribelaw

Activist

7 accounts had antivaccine attitudes; 4 accounts were so called “conspiracy theorists.” Verified accounts 11
were @Jimcorrsays, @RobertKennedyJr

Medical expert

@Drdavidsamadi (urologist and Fox News pundit); @FaheemYounus (MD and Chief of Infectious
Diseases at a university hospital); @DrEricDing (epidemiologist, National Foundation of Infectious
Diseases); @ProfKarolSikora (oncologist)

10

Academic Organizations

@UniofOxford, and @TheLancet

2

Others

Government (n=2), business (n=2), culture (n=6), personal (n=10), suspended (n=5), politician (n=5)

30

The coding took place in December 2020. It is possible some account statuses could have changed since our initial coding.

Level of Engagement in Each Community
K-core was investigated by eliminating minimal edge
connections with other nodes. The 7-core graph in Figure 3
shows that the antivaccination group is a “tier one” group, which
includes actors who are densely connected to each other by
heavily retweeting content generated among themselves. Many
actors in the antivaccine group were connected to at least 7 other

https://infodemiology.jmir.org/2022/1/e34231
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clique members, most of whom were in the same community.
Therefore, information can be shared quickly within the
antivaccine group, and members of this clique behave in a
cohesive manner. In contrast, the political left, science, and
medical expert communities lost most of the cliques by 5-core.
This means that actors in these communities are less cohesive
and depend on heterogeneous information sources compared to
those in the antivaccine group.

JMIR Infodemiology 2022 | vol. 2 | iss. 1 | e34231 | p. 6
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Figure 3. K-core graphs demonstrating the density of groups: (A) 2-core, (B) 5-core, (C) 6-core, and (D) 7-core.

Primary Topics Discussed Within Communities
In order to understand the content discussed in the major
communities, we conducted content analysis of tweets created
and shared by influential actors. The result showed the concerns
of the political right and antivaccine community included
vaccine safety and infringing on rights and liberty. The Trump
and White House and political left clusters used vaccines as a
partisan tool to gain political advantage. The following
paragraphs provide summaries of the inductive coding results
for the 7 selected clusters.
The content of the Trump and the White House cluster showed
the COVID-19 vaccine was a major presidential deliverable as
evidence of political legitimacy in the present and future. This
cluster’s tweets were highly partisan, showing President Trump
was successfully managing the rollout of the vaccine—hence
worthy of political trust (eg, White House Press Secretary
@KayleighMcEnany: “These critical investments in a
coronavirus vaccine are due to the fact that we have a
businessman in the White House.” [41]).
Two major arguments that were repeatedly called out in the
Tweets were (1) use of the COVID-19 vaccine to demonstrate
Trump's sound management and growth of the national
economy, legitimizing his presidency, and (2) use of “speed of
planning” for vaccine development, manufacturing, and
distribution to demonstrate Trump's capable management of
complex national processes, again legitimizing his presidency.
These markers—money and time—were likewise used in some
oppositional Tweets proposing political mismanagement by
Biden.
The content of the political right cluster was closely linked to
themes of antivaccine and Trump and the White House clusters,
with about one-third citing conspiracies, often naming the
untrustworthy beneficiaries with motives of depopulation,
corruption, and DNA disruption: “Bill Gates vaccine agenda
#DEPOPULATION Fauci awarded a $3.7M research grant to
https://infodemiology.jmir.org/2022/1/e34231
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the Wuhan lab, working on BioW Coronavirus. Wuhan labs
wants to Patent Gilead’s Remdesivir. Fauci is on the board of
Gates Foundation. Gates gave CDC $13.5M & is second largest
funder to the W.H.O.” [42].
This cluster also expressed distrust of Big Pharma, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and scientific and
medical decision makers. Surprisingly, the cluster indicated a
degree of distrust in Big Government and the Trump
administration; when present, the distrust was largely related
to suspicion of direct financial benefits (patents, stock
ownership).
Other conspiracy themes included unauthorized collection of
personal information (eg, DNA, tracking). An emergent
conspiracy theme in the conservative activist cluster included
beliefs that the vaccine was deliberately designed to depopulate
through killing recipients or causing sterility. This cluster also
made accusations tying them as conscious agendas of the social
movement and having a reluctance to mandatory vaccination
challenging their American values of freedom and liberty.
Conspiracies, paralleled in less radical tweets, reported
government and pharmaceutical sectors negotiated release from
liability for known side effects from the vaccine. Extreme
conspiracies cited cover-ups for massive death and complication
rates in ongoing human trials that were complemented by
vaccines being unnecessary due to supposedly promising
alternative treatments and therapies—most notably
hydroxychloroquine.
The antivaccine cluster was highly connected within and with
the political right cluster. The top 5 influential nodes in the
antivaccine cluster were either not verified (n=4) or suspended
(n=1). Topical trends related to conservative ideology including
freedom and rights, and the forcible control over citizen’s
actions and bodies included narratives like the arguments in the
political right cluster. Topical trends included that the vaccine
was unnecessary or ineffective, referencing claims of health,
fitness, and cognitive ability to beat an infection. The topic of
JMIR Infodemiology 2022 | vol. 2 | iss. 1 | e34231 | p. 7
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lack of trust of Big Pharma and the justice system was expressed
as suspicion of releasing manufacturer liability by minimizing
vaccination risks and manufacturer culpability. Mistrust was
high in specific conspiracies in this cluster that often linked Big
Tech, Big Pharma, and Big Government. Topics also included
DNA disruption and fears of adding unknown substances to the
vaccine like tracking devices, genetic material theft, and general
“unknown” materials. There were few scientific claims; more
widespread were claims of censorship.
The content of the science cluster indicated broad approval and
encouragement of the vaccine and its makers with some distrust
against the Trump administration. The latter explains the
distance between the Trump and the White House cluster and
scientists in Figure 2. Expressed concerns centered around the
rapidity of vaccine development with compromise of safety.
This content was saliently tied to Trump in 3 core ways: (1)
Tweets criticized Trump’s rapid vaccine rollout citing it as the
“October election vaccine;” (2) tweets focused on corruption
and equity, demanding Trump provide a universal, free vaccine;
and (3) tweets highlighted Trump’s retweets of a doctor who
claimed the vaccine was from alien DNA, reinforcing his schism
with the scientific community and principles. This cluster did
demonstrate some trust of the Trump administration through
the surrogate of Fauci as expressed in tweets on Fauci’s role
and advice being “spot on” or discussed his disinterest in the
vaccine “race” as against Russia, all highlighting partisan
messaging during the development process. Aside from these
fears, this cluster exhibited apprehensions about the growing
role of antivaccine advocacy groups with general concerns that
“antisocial” messages will coincide with the public inoculation
timeline.
The content of the medical expert cluster demonstrated similar
themes to the science cluster by containing specific
evidence—for example, not just documenting progress
milestones but including supporting descriptive statistics. Like
the media cluster, references and links were used to promote
longer content with articles and interviews serving as evidence.
This cluster used historical and comparative rhetoric with other
diseases and responses, but unlike other clusters, used the
historical or comparative references to overcome current barriers
or cause for optimism. Similar to other clusters, structural
limitations in manufacturing and distribution were raised. A
functional clue to expected audience is demonstrated in the
dissemination of medical analyses and science claims, noted
by dense jargon without a primer for the public. Although a
small number of tweets actively engaged the malignment of the
vaccine by addressing antivaccine propaganda or
misinformation, it was not distributed among many accounts.
Likewise, conspiracy tweets from (2) accounts demonstrated
how people without medical expertise cross talked the medical
cluster.
The content of the major news media cluster involved broad
support for the vaccine and its makers and differed from other
clusters in its analysis of the vaccine narrative through 3 main
topics. First, nearly one-quarter of the content either documented
the status of vaccine manufacturing progress or suspected date
of availability. Second, a timing theme speculated about plans
for vaccine manufacture and distribution. Although other
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clusters were concerned about timing, the media’s concern
largely focused on milestones and speculated about deliverables,
rather than expounding on vaccine safety risks or economic
outcomes. Third, elements of skepticism and distrust were
present in the form of the attention given to “dose deals” (where
countries contracted future access to vaccines) and ethical
violations (intellectual property violations, deliberate risks to
human trial volunteers). This was complemented by content
with overt and secondary implications of vaccine nationalism
or of international cooperation. Although political implications
were present in many tweets, they were less partisan in nature
than other clusters.
The political left cluster contained mixed messages about trust
regarding the vaccine. A small number believed the vaccine is
one method to combat the virus, most were divisive, and
approximately 20% circulated conspiracy theories. Contributors
expressed distrust through vaccine hesitancy patterns; others
expressed trust that the vaccine is the “lynchpin” by which
society can return to normal. Within this cluster, there were
claims that (1) vaccine science is sound, but Trump’s political
manipulation of the timeline to optimize the election has
compromised the trusted process; (2) vaccine manufacturing is
being used as a conspiratorial economic investment to Trump’s
allies, again compromising the manufacture and distribution;
and (3) the Trump administration was subverting American
ethics like hard work, integrity, and innovation by ignoring or
supporting international violations of intellectual property. This
cluster also included a pattern of partisan rhetoric in tweets that
explicitly used Trump as a metaphor or symbol for the virus
(eg, the Trump Virus or Trump is the Virus/Biden is the Cure).

Discussion
Principal Findings
Using network analysis and unsupervised machine learning
with samples from Twitter data and conducting inductive coding
to characterize tweet discourse, we found that, during this
period, COVID-19 vaccine Twitter conversations were already
highly polarized. The most influential Twitter actors were not
scientists and medical experts but rather partisan actors and
antivaxxers. Actors on both the political left and political right
expressed skepticism and misgivings toward the COVID-19
vaccine development process but were motivated by different
concerns and used different language to describe their concerns.
Conspiracy theories were raised on both sides.
Our analyses of Twitter posts during the height of stay-at-home
measures in the United States and amid the race to develop
COVID-19 vaccines demonstrated a high degree of Twitter
social media activity related to vaccine development. Twitter
vaccine conversations were highly polarized, with different
actors occupying separate “clusters,” reinforcing concerns about
“information bubbles.” The level of polarization was similar to
a deeply political event such as the Muller investigation of
Russian interference in the 2016 US elections [43].
Media and science or medical actors were especially absent
from the conservative clusters, and antivaccine sentiment was
especially salient in the political right cluster. Results also
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showed “antivaccine” groups to be highly engaged actors in the
COVID-19 vaccine conversation, circulating information
particularly within a tight conservative cluster.

Health Information Sources and the Politicization of
Science
These findings have important implications for health
professionals’ communication and education about vaccines.
Although it may not be public health professionals’ traditional
roles to address the politicized nature of vaccine acceptance, it
is increasingly important for them to understand how patients
gather health information from online platforms and “adjudicate
the merits of such information” [11].
Previous research has shown how a small but influential handful
of actors with medical credentials or authority can
disproportionately sway Twitter conversations and promote the
spread of misinformation. This misinformation can then be
further amplified by partisan actors who misrepresent and
exaggerate these statements for political gain. For instance,
Haupt et al [44] found that a single group claiming medical and
scientific credibility and authority (ie, Dr Immanuel and
America’s Frontline Doctors) successfully promoted the use of
hydroxychloroquine, even though the efficacy of
hydroxychloroquine had not yet been fully demonstrated.
Political (eg, Trump) and media sources then amplified and
disseminated this information in support of the use of
hydroxychloroquine [44]. Our empirical evidence shows that
the vaccine conversation had already become politicized along
partisan lines before the vaccine was available, with vaccine
acceptance driven by ideological beliefs and attitudes,
particularly among Twitter influencers. As previous research
shows, when disease threats become partisan, or “politicized,”
people look to their preferred political party to decide how much
they ought to worry [45,46]. Once politicized, issues can be
hard to depoliticize, and rather than looking to science or
medical experts, people look to less credible sources of
information or adopt practices, such as vaccine refusal, that may
be hard to alter.
The politicization of the COVID-19 vaccine conversation is an
important empirical outcome because, although politicization
of science has existed in environmental politics and policy [47],
this is a relatively newer development for public health policy.
Although certain public health issues have long been politicized
(eg, sexual and reproductive health, HIV policy) [48], other
infectious disease threats have not been politicized in the same
way as COVID-19. For instance, the findings from this study
contrast with the findings from a Twitter analysis during the
Zika pandemic. Research showed that the Twitter conversation
about Zika was not polarized; instead, there was higher trust in
medical and scientific authorities, even though the Zika health
crisis data were collected during the summer of the Presidential
2016 election campaign, just as our data set was also collected
(July 2020) [49]. By contrast, the issue environment surrounding
our data collection was highly politicized during—and even
before—the pandemic [45,50,51], thereby enabling partisan
actors and political elites, not medical experts or scientists, to
play an important role in leading the discourse.
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Political Attitudes, Health Beliefs, and Behaviors
Our findings contribute to knowledge development examining
the relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward
science [52-54]. Although the conservative network was marked
by an overrepresentation of partisan and vaccine skeptic actors
and an underrepresentation of science or medical experts, this
may be the result of deliberate targeting of political
conservatives rather than a reflection of an inherent skepticism
of the scientific community rooted in ideological differences
[53]. Rather, this research demonstrates that actors on both the
political left and political right expressed skepticism and
misgivings toward the COVID-19 vaccine but were motivated
by different concerns and language, suggesting both
conservative and liberal actors are susceptible to political
manipulation and framing of issues. Notably, conspiracy theories
were present in both liberal and conservative clusters, further
supporting the contextual hypothesis that both liberals and
conservatives are likely to doubt science if scientific information
contradicts their preconceived worldviews [52,54].
Although the analysis of tweets in each cluster revealed highly
divided vaccine discourses among specific political
communities, “distrust” arose as a common (and primary)
construct advanced by partisan actors throughout the content
analysis. On the liberal side, general distrust of the COVID-19
vaccine development process was expressed through fears that
its speed would compromise safety (science cluster), dosing
deals and ethical violations (major news media cluster), and the
intentional abuse of the progress timeline for political gain
(political left cluster).
Within the political right and antivaccine clusters, themes that
emerged included distrust and antivaccine rationales rooted in
conservative ideology including language of freedom or rights,
forcible control over citizen actions and bodies, and large-scale
economic profit.
Evidence that “antivaccine actors” were more heavily present
in conservative networks was prominent in this study, and
conspiracy theories and conservative ideologies of freedom and
rights were prevalent themes that were not previously evident
in the vaccine hesitancy literature. This is consistent with
concerns that have been raised about how the antivax movement
is specifically targeting political conservatives and the far right
through a campaign of “medical freedom” to advance their cause
[9,55]. Further investigation of this finding may help explain
why White Republicans have been identified as the most vaccine
hesitant group in recent polls [56,57].

Implications for Public Health Communication Using
Social Media
Given the growing proportion of the population that attains
health news through social media [58,59], it is important for
public health professionals to harness the power of social media
to support situational awareness (ie, public’s behavior, emotion,
information demand) [12]. Additionally, the findings from our
study and related studies can be used to help identify and counter
the narrow group of influencers that are most responsible for
amplifying antivaccine sentiment such as through better
enforcement of platforms’ existing standards [21].
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Methodological Implications and Limitations
Methodologically, this study demonstrated how to identify the
most influential actors during an acute public health crisis and
how information clusters have formed on social media at a
critical moment when people’s attitudes toward the vaccines
were being formed. This knowledge is beneficial for developing
health communication strategies on which social media
“influencers” to target for information distribution or for
counter-messaging.
Nevertheless, there are limitations to this study. First,
interpretation of the results of our study are necessarily bounded
by the Twitter platform, which does not always reflect the
general public (ie, Twitters are younger, likely to be liberal with
higher incomes than US adults, and strongly influenced by a
small number of prolific users) [60]. Consequently, Twitter
reactions do not always reflect overall public opinion [61].
Therefore, the results of this analysis should not be regarded as
emblematic of broader attitudes and beliefs on COVID-19
vaccines. Also, we do not know if the platform specifically
affected the differences between Twitter and survey studies on
vaccine hesitancy discourse. Therefore, future studies may
investigate the same phenomenon using different methods.
Traditional survey methods rely on self-report and may create
incentives for participants to give politically correct responses;
however. these do not allow elaboration due to standardized
question wordings [62]. By contrast, Twitter data include
expression of users in their natural environment and enable
synchronous data collection as one’s expressions occur.
Therefore, Twitter (or other social media) data include more
current sentiments on vaccine hesitancy.
Second, we decided not to delete bots because (1) determining
bot accounts requires further investigation on setting a proper
threshold, (2) accounts with higher bot scores do not seem to
seriously interfere with discussions, and (3) deleting bots means

Hagen et al
artificially manipulating a raw data set because bots are part of
the Twitter ecosystem. Using our data set, we detected bots to
investigate to what extent bots are interfering with vaccine
conversations by running one of the most popular bot detection
algorithms called Botometer [63]. Emulating the study by Hagen
et al [43] that found political bots’ effect on the network
structure, we investigated the proportions of bots among the
most influential actors. We were not able to find outstanding
evidence of bots systematically interfering with the conversation
in our data set to the extent to justify deletion of bot accounts.
More importantly, when we initially set a relatively conservative
threshold of a 0.7 complete automation probability (CAP) score
following previous Botometer research [64], human accounts
were frequently tagged as bots (ie, the Twitter account of former
President Obama had a bot score of 0.8). This means that,
without further detailed study to decide a proper threshold for
the Botometer to accurately detect bots (we conducted a separate
study for this), it is better not to delete bots from the data to
preserve the natural ecosystem of Twitter.

Conclusions
COVID-19 vaccine conversations in July 2020 were highly
polarized along partisan political lines. Specifically, “actors”
on the political right of the spectrum formed a tight
information-sharing cluster that was highly siloed and infiltrated
by the antivaccine community; this group tended to circulate
conspiracy theories and were far less likely to distribute vaccine
knowledge from scientific and medical expert clusters.
Concerningly, “trust” in a COVID-19 vaccine was highly
manipulated by partisan actors on both the left and the right for
political advantage. These findings are informative for designing
improved vaccine information communication strategies to be
delivered on social media. Although polarization and the echo
chamber effect are not new in political conversations on social
media, it was a concern to observe these in health conversations
on COVID-19 vaccines during the vaccine development process.
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